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Abstract
US foreign aid has always been a topic in dispute amongst the American
people, but there is a strategic end that Americans miss when they think of aid. The US
has made an effective practice of using aid allocations as leverage to reach US foreign
policy goals. One way the US reaches its goals is by altering the voting behavior in the
UN so that states are compliant with US interests. There has been debate about the
ability of the US to alter UN voting behavior, but this study found evidence that the US
can effectively use foreign aid to influence UN voting compliance. This study will
analyze 149 US aid receiving countries over a 19-year period and uses important votes to
the US, not all UN resolutions. Using the important resolutions is vital to this study
because I ask if the US can influence voting compliance when it is important to US
interests. The best way to analyze if the US can influence UN votes when it needs to is
by examining the occurrences when policymakers would put forth the effort and
resources. In addition this thesis operationalizes two forms of compliance, one that
measures half compliance, where abstentions and absences are treated as neutral votes,
and the other that gauges active compliance, where abstentions and absences are treated
as non-compliance. The second analysis examines the different effects of economic aid
and military aid on voting compliance. Both economic and military aid effect half
compliance, but only one form of military aid has an effect on active compliance. The
third analysis tests if the US uses aid more effectively as an inducement before the vote
or as rewards/punishments after the fact, my findings show that generally inducements
are more effective at coercing compliance. The last analysis studies regional variations in
UN voting compliance. The dummy variables for Africa, Asia, Eurasia and the Middle
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East have negative correlations with voting compliance, while Latin America and Eastern
Europe have positive relationships with UN voting compliance. These four analyses help
to better understand the relationship between US aid and UN voting compliance and add
to some of the debates in this literature.

v

Chapter 1 Introduction
US foreign aid allocations have always been a salient and complex issue. There
tends to be the attitude that America should look after its own people before helping other
peoples causing a continual demand that foreign aid be justified. Besides the possible
good that foreign aid contributes to other countries, like helping poverty stricken women
and children, there is also a strategic goal. Foreign aid is a tool that the US government
uses to alter the behavior of other countries.
Since the Cold War the US has used foreign aid to influence voting behavior in
the United Nations. By altering the votes of other countries to comply with the
preferences of the US, American policymakers have had an opportunity to shape the UN
to support their interests and goals. This type of influence is powerful especially since
the UN has become the most inclusive international organization in the world. Since the
end of World War II the number of UN members has gone from 51 in 1945 to 191
members in 2001.1 The United Nations has become a prominent player in international
politics. It has the ability to make international law, judgments against states, and
validate or negate the importance of issues through its voting process. The UN is a
strong institution that provides a forum for nations to air their grievances, cooperate to
solve global problems, and establish order in the international community. The strength
of the UN lies in its ability to lend credibility and legitimacy to the issues that are debated
within it and the decisions it comes to. The US would benefit greatly to have a
continued influence on the outcomes of certain UN resolutions.

1
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The purpose of this thesis is to see how effective the United States government is
in using foreign aid to influence UN voting on key resolutions. Studies examining the
relationship between foreign aid and voting compliance have been conducted in the past,
but inconclusive results and methodological differences have left room for more analysis.
The first part of this paper examines the role of US foreign aid as a tool of influence. I
examine the relationship between US aid and UN voting. Then I examine regional
differences and variations in voting compliance. There are four main arguments this
paper posits. The first is that US foreign aid has a positive and significant relationship
with UN voting compliance. I argue that the US allocates foreign aid to those states that
will vote in compliance with the US on key resolutions. Along with the Agency for
International Development, the Department of State, Department of Defense and the
National Security Council are all included in the decision process of aid allocation
(Ruttan 1996, 135). There is a strategic purpose in each dollar a recipient country
receives and for this reason I expect to see a significant relationship between US foreign
aid and UN voting compliance.
The second argument in this paper is that economic aid is generally more
important to recipient states than military aid. Economic aid has the ability to influence
more states because it is allocated to more countries than military aid. In the current
global environment where there are many more developing countries. Aid that assists
with building domestic institutions and establishing stability is more valuable. These
countries are not concerned with military might, but providing for their people.
Economic aid has more leverage because it is needed more.
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Analyzing the different types of foreign aid has not been done in this literature
before. Researchers have not looked at economic aid as a different entity than military
aid, but simply grouped them together. But understanding the different effect economic
and military aid has is important when examining the effects of aid on voting compliance.
It is possible that economic aid has much more influence over UN voting compliance and
that military aid has little influence on voting behavior. When a researcher groups both
together they could cancel each other’s effect out or skew the results in one direction or
another. By splitting the total US aid amount into its two parts the analysis can observe
which form of aid influences voting compliance more effectively. There is an
inconsistency in the literature about US aid and UN voting and this could be attributed to
the impact of different forms of aid. It is logical to assume that the forms of aid are used
to reach different goals because each will provide a distinctive form of leverage. This
type of study has not been conducted because of data constraints. Most researchers with
the exception of Rai (1980) have used OECD data, which does not break aid down into
its different types. The Greenbook data from the US Department of State, which does
break aid into two types, has always been an available resource, but it was a tedious
process to find each year from Department of State publications. Basically, the process
of gathering that data was difficult and not the best option when there was OECD data in
a useable form, but now the Greenbook data is in one place on the World Wide Web in
an easily accessible form.2 Since that the data hindrance is gone examining the two
forms of US aid is now possible.

2

Greenbook website, http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/overview.html.
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The third argument is that reward/punishments (aid that is altered after the vote as
a response to previous voting compliance) will be more effective than inducements (aid
that comes before the vote as an incentive to comply) when altering UN voting
compliance. Previous studies have had a difficult time finding results in this relationship,
but because this study will test a longer period of time the relationship should emerge.
When the benefits come after the compliance it leaves room for the US to respond
proportionally to the level of compliance a recipient state had. The punishments and
rewards will be more effective and hold more leverage if they are a response to
compliance rather than a precursor to possible compliance. By using rewards and
punishments there is an equal quid-pro-quo relationship.
The last argument that this paper will make is that regional variations in voting
compliance will emerge. Latin American countries with few money generating resources
will be more likely to comply with the US in exchange for aid than Middle Eastern
countries that have the means to support their state and are not reliant on US aid. There
are also ties with organizations or alignments that may reinforce compliant or noncompliant behavior. In the end there will be overall variations that will define the
different regions and their levels of compliance with the US on key UN resolutions.
This thesis analyzes Greenbook data from the Department of State to measure
economic, military, and total aid allocations. I will use the Congressional Reports on UN
voting behavior from the Department of State to identify the important votes for the US.
The 2002 publication of the World Development Indicators from the OECD along with
Polity IV Project are used to measure all other control variables.

4

In the first part of this paper I present some previous research on US foreign aid
and UN voting behavior. I also discuss the debates and inconsistencies that arise in the
literature that directly affect theoretical and methodological considerations taken in this
study. Finally I discuss specific regional variations in the UN. In the second part of this
paper I present and discuss my data, methods and findings.
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Chapter 2 Review of Literature
Before I review the work on UN voting behavior I will review the work of
Zimmerman (1993) along with Palmer, Wohlander and Morgan (2002) and Ruttan (1996)
because they provide a closer examination on the US government’s ability to use foreign
aid as a tool of influence.
Robert Zimmerman (1993) argues in his book, Dollars, Diplomacy, and
Dependency-Dilemmas of U.S. Economic Aid, “the primary purpose of U.S. economic
assistance is to support the diplomatic process, that is, promote overall U.S. foreign
policy objectives,” (Zimmerman 1993, 55). His book is about the poor record of
economic aid in actually helping developing states. He traces the uses of foreign aid by
the US government in the past. He argues for the effectiveness of US aid as a political
tool of influence in achieving political goals. He notes that the US has used economic aid
to effectively influence virtually every region in the world to reach a large array of short
term US political objectives. Zimmerman (1993) argues that there are not many areas of
foreign politics that the US cannot influence. He latter asserts that aid is used to
strengthen the relationships between the US and leaders of recipient countries. He finds
that aid has nothing to do with assisting developing states, but fulfilling short-term
political goals.
Zimmerman (1993) points out that the US has used foreign aid to advance many
different US objectives. His implication that foreign aid may be used to avoid an out
right opposition is an important observation. The US may focus not only on compliance
but also avoiding non-compliance, which Zimmerman implies are two separate ideas.
The study acknowledges that the US gives large amounts of aid to states and the results
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of the aid influence are never seen. However, Palmer (2002) can explain this because he
argues that there may be another foreign policy goal the US is trying to reach. Aid could
be used to alter behavior into inaction or remaining neutral on an issue, which is why this
study includes a measure that incorporates the neutral votes. Overall, Zimmerman has
shed light on the different uses of US foreign aid in altering behavior. He has shown that
the US may use foreign aid to dissuade opposition or to persuade a state not to act.
Brian Lai (2003) writes about the supposed change in foreign aid goals since the
Cold War. His article examines the hypothesis that since the end of the Cold War there is
a different emphasis on US foreign aid goals, which focuses less on achieving political
and strategic goals. He found that the US did not stop using aid as leverage when dealing
with states after the fall of the Soviet Union. Even though the amounts of aid distributed
fell the US has still been successful at using foreign aid as leverage over recipient states
to reach foreign policy goals. His conclusion is that using foreign aid to reach political
goals is even more important now than during the Cold War. Foreign aid continues to be
used as leverage to influence states’ behavior and aid distributions are still calculated
efforts at reaching political goals.
The next author, Vernon Ruttan (1996), writes a descriptive analysis of US aid
policies. He argues that when aid allocations are being calculated the first factor taken
into consideration is how well the recipient can assist the US in reaching its foreign goals.
Those states that are beneficial to the US interests will receive aid to influence their
behavior. Foreign aid is used to strengthen the political commitment of the recipient to
the donor country. Ruttan (1996) asserts that every administration since the late 1940’s
has considered foreign aid essential to implement any foreign policy goals.
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Palmer, Wohlander and Morgan (2002) argue that different parts of a state’s
foreign policy resources serve different purposes. The article focuses on economic
transfers by applying a general theory of foreign policy and examine when a state will
use foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy. They develop a theory that explains how a
state uses its foreign policy resources, like aid. They call it a “two-good,” model, where
foreign aid is an instrument of the state that can be used to reach different foreign policy
goals. The tools a state uses in foreign politics can be used to maintain the status quo or
enact change. Foreign aid is a change inspiring resource whose purpose is to alter the
status quo. However, Palmer et al. argue that the environment limits the effectiveness of
foreign aid. Their research finds that there are constraints to the amount of change
foreign aid can create. The biggest indicator of how effective aid will be is the amount of
aid that can be allocated. Their argument is that the amount of resources dedicated to a
certain state will dictate if the US will be successful in changing its behavior. According
to this logic, the more aid allocated the more compliant states ought to be. This study did
not address the US’ ability or effectiveness to use aid, but it does give a view of the US
government’s purpose and usage of foreign aid. Their final results are that foreign aid is
directed at recipient states to behave according to the donor’s benefit.
A secondary goal of the Palmer et al. (2002) piece was to justify the existence of a
weak relationship between US aid and UN voting compliance. They begin by
acknowledging that previous authors found inconclusive results when they tested to see
what conditions allow the US to use foreign aid to influence behavior changes. However,
they attribute the variation in the findings from previous studies to the fact that states may
have different purposes for their foreign aid resources. In addition, weak relationships
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may exist because aid allocations are only partially directed towards voting compliance
and the rest of the aid leverage goes towards other goals. Aid may have a small influence
on UN voting compliance because it is only supposed to have a limited affect on voting
behavior. They argue that finding weak relationships could be accurate because UN
voting compliance may only be a small function of foreign aid.
Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) provide a slightly different opinion of foreign
aid. They look at foreign aid as a function of utility by the donor country. Their basic
argument is that states do not give aid away without expecting to get something back in
return and that aid is given to the states that have the most usefulness in reaching the
donor’s goals. Dudley and Montmarquette use two separate models to test for the supply
and demand of aid from the view of the donor country. They found that aid allocation
was partially based on political concerns. They also found that foreign aid had “strong
decreasing returns to a donor in converting its foreign aid into impact on a given recipient
country,” (Dudley and Montmarquette 1976, 142). Their findings suggest that aid is
unable to maintain the amount of compliance that the donor would like. Despite the
similar motives and assumptions as Palmer et al. (2002), they find that the allocation of
aid will become incapable of influencing behavior eventually.
The dominant theme in this literature is that foreign aid is not designed to help
needy countries, but to attain specific US goals. US foreign aid has been used to
influence states and exert leverage over countries since the Cold War and continues to be
important and useful in achieving a wide range of US interests. The previous authors
have shown that US aid can change the behavior of recipient states.
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The previous literature described how effective US foreign aid could be in
influencing states’ behavior, but the next group deals specifically with US aid and how it
influences UN voting compliance. From the literature above we can be comfortable with
the assumption that US foreign aid does hold some place in American foreign politics as
a source of influence. However the question now becomes does US foreign aid influence
UN voting compliance?
Kegley and Hook (1991) find no relationship between US aid allocations and UN
voting behavior. The study examines the effectiveness of Reagan’s 1986 policy linking
aid to recipient countries directly to their amount of UN voting compliance. They argue
that Reagan’s policy does not produce compliant behavior, in fact the level of compliance
lowers after implementing the policy. The article analyzes voting and aid trends for the
two years before and after the implementation of Reagan’s policy.
Aid distributions and voting compliance both dropped immediately after the 1986
policy is initiated, which signifies a high coincidence level. However, Kegley and Hook
calculate the changes over time with Spearman’s R and Pearson’s R and find that the
correlations before and after the policy initiative do not change. Which means that even
with the explicit linkage between aid and voting agreement combined with lower levels
of aid the correlations between US aid and voting compliance stays the same. Rai (1980)
could contest this finding because he finds that the US is not very effective with
reward/punishment activities, which explains why this policy does not work as well as
expected. Next Kegley and Hook include a one year lag in their analysis because the
cause and effect between aid and voting coincidence does not occur immediately. Their
lagged findings support their bivariate analysis results that after the alteration of aid
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allocations they find no significant change in voting coincidence with the US. Then they
perform a cross-sectional, lagged, longitudinal multiple regression before and after the
policy was implemented to control for multicolinearity. They test for two aid
measurements: total aid and US aid as a proportion of the GDP. This test supports the
previous analyses in that the results do not support the supposed relationship between US
aid and UN voting coincidence.
Marin-Bosch (1987) provides a descriptive analysis of overall UN voting trends.
This article describes US voting practices, which shows the US compliance with a poor
record in UN voting. He begins the article by stating that the best way to tell about a
country’s interests are to look at the 10-12 votes that they find important to understand
why a state will behave a certain way, but dismisses this form of analysis because no two
states share similar interests and there is no way to analyze across states. Instead he opts
to look at all UN resolutions. His findings present a daunting view of the US’ ability to
influence compliant voting behavior. Most of the resolutions are reached with a majority,
the average acceptance was with an 80% majority approval. Since the 1980s the level of
opposition by Western states and Israel has risen to 43%. The US is unique in its
percentage of rejection of UN resolutions, it has surpassed the Soviet Union levels to
reach 81% rejection level. This means that only 19% of the time the US is willing to vote
for a UN resolution. This does not necessarily have to be a negative point for the US,
other states could comply with the US and reject the resolution. However, this seems
unlikely because the US also cast the only negative vote 98 times in the 1980s. This
implies that there will be little voting compliance with the US.
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Russett (1967) finds that voting alignments are the main influence on UN voting
behavior. He accounts for 78% of the variation in different issues by the voting groups
that form in the UN General Assembly. (Russett 1967, 63) This study analyses all 66 roll
call votes in the plenary and committees for the 1963 session. Russett includes every
resolution vote except those that are adopted by a 90% majority. He codes each vote
with a 2 for an affirmative response, 1 for abstentions, and 0 for negative votes. He takes
these codes and runs a regression with the different voting alignments. He conducts a
factor analysis to identify the different groups. He finds 8 clusters of voting alignments:
Western Community, Brazzaville Africans, Latin America, Afro-Asians, Communists,
Conservative Arabs, Iberia, and Unclassifiable. He finds that these groups develop
because of shared preferences and voting patterns in the major issues in the General
Assembly of UN.3 His argument is that the best predictor of UN voting behavior is the
voting group a state identifies with and that countries in the US’ voting cluster are the
only states that will show high levels of voting compliance. Russett implies voting
compliance is based on similar interests and UN voting alignments, not external non-UN
factors like aid.
The next article is the foundation of contemporary studies on US foreign aid and
UN voting. Eugene Wittkopf’s article, “Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A
Comparative Study,” (1973) has been widely used to guide the methodology of research
on aid and UN voting studies. The purpose of the article is to examine the relationships
between foreign aid allocations and outcomes in the UN General Assembly. His
hypothesis was “the larger the agreement in General Assembly voting exhibited by a
3

The 5 major issues for 1963 are: Cold War, Self-Determination, Intervention in Africa, Supranationalism
(making the UN bigger), and Palestine.
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developing state with a foreign aid donor, the greater will be the amount of aid it receives
from that donor.” (Wittkopf 1973, 868) He also looks at every committee and plenary
vote in 1963 and 1966. Wittkopf studies the overall relationship between any donor’s aid
allocations and the recipient’s voting behavior. He utilizes OECD foreign aid data for the
analysis. The donor countries were all 12 members of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) and the Soviet Union. All aid recipient states were chosen from the
group of developing nations, defined by the OECD as receiving aid from one of the DAC
countries. He includes lead and lag aid variables to test if aid is allocated as an
inducement as the cause for voting behavior or reward/punishment as a consequence for
past voting behavior.
Wittkopf operationalizes four variables in his study, the first two variables
measure foreign aid and the second two variables measure agreement.

For foreign aid

the first measurement is the absolute amount of foreign aid from each DAC donor to its
recipients. The second is a transaction flow measurement that draws attention to above
or below average aid distributions. The first agreement variable measures the instances
when the donor and recipient countries vote identically as a percentage of all resolution
votes. The second agreement variable is a relative agreement index that calculates the
expected agreement so that the actual agreement can be compared to a statistical norm.
This also allows for analysis and comparison between donors and recipients. He
examines the covariation between voting patterns in 1963 and 1966 with aid allocations
for 1962-1964 and 1965-1967.
Both years exhibit an overall positive correlation between foreign aid and voting
agreement for the 12 donor countries. However, the findings also suggest that most
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donors were giving aid to their enemies rather than their friends. The US has statistically
significant results that indicate the more voting agreement states have with the US the
more aid the recipient countries receive. An interesting finding is that the strong, positive
statistically significant relationship between foreign aid and UN voting agreement only
holds true for the US out of all 12 DAC members. The amount of voting agreement
explained was too low to produce a concrete differentiation between aid as an
inducement or reward/punishment so we are not able to see if aid is an incentive or if is
altered in response to previous voting compliance. But Wittkopf’s study provides
evidence that one of the DAC countries, the US, uses foreign aid as an influence over UN
voting, which supports his hypothesis.
Kul Rai (1980) finds interesting and conflicting results in his study that examines
the relationship between US foreign aid and General Assembly votes from 1967-1976.
He examines two separate hypotheses for both the US and the Soviet Union, one focuses
on aid as inducements and the other analyzes aid as a reward or punishment. When aid
used as an inducement it is given before the vote as an incentive for voting compliance.
Aid as a reward/punishment is when the amount of aid is altered as a response to previous
voting behavior. He begins this study in response to earlier research that is riddled with
conflicting results. He feels that there is still a need to test the relationship further
because there are contrasting results from the same research question.
Rai examines votes from the plenary session and the seven main committees over
a ten-year period.4 The data on aid is from the Department of State’s official publications
for the Agency of International Development. He includes three independent variables

4

With the exception of 1968, 1971, and 1974.
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for foreign aid: total amount of aid received; per capita aid; and aid as a percentage of
GDP.

For his aid variables, he excludes any state that does not receive US aid for one

year during his 10-year analysis. Any abstentions or absences from votes were
considered non-compliant behavior and votes that were adopted by a 90% “virtually
unanimous vote,” (Rai 1980, 270) were excluded. For agreement measurements Rai uses
Lijphart’s Index of Agreement (1963), which places compliance levels between 0 and
100%. To test the relationship of aid as an inducement he uses a two-year lead and to test
aid as a reward/punishment Rai calculates a two-year lag. He uses Pearson’s R to
analyze the relationship between foreign aid and UN voting agreement as a general trend
and for three regions (Africa, Latin America, and Middle East/South Asia). This is the
first aid and UN voting study to specifically look at regions to determine any
relationships that may be different than the general relationship. He looks at a deeper
level to find the individual components that make the overall trends. This is important
because they can be informative in explaining why a certain result was found.
He finds that total aid and voting agreement have no correlation and occasionally
the findings report negative results. According to Rai’s results, the association between
voting agreement and aid as a percentage of GDP is also weak. However, the variable for
per capita aid has a positive and statistically significant relationship with UN voting
agreement from 1967-1972. Another crucial finding was that US aid works more
effectively as an inducement rather than reward/punishment.
The regional analysis also yields different results for each region. For the
correlation between total aid and voting agreement all the regions have a negative or
weak association. Latin America reveals high positive agreements between voting
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agreement with per capita aid and voting agreement with US aid as a percentage of the
total aid. While Africa and Middle East/South Asia have little correlation with either of
those two aid variables. Even though there were higher levels of US aid allocation in
Africa the relationships remain weak. And a lower aid allocation to Latin America had
no effect on the strong, positive relationship.
The starting place for my research is T.Y. Wang’s (1999) article “U.S. Foreign
Aid and UN voting: An analysis of Important Issues.” Wang looked at the previous
research on US aid and UN voting and found that there may be a reason for conflicting
findings. Throughout this literature we see conclusive results supporting both sides of the
debate about US aid and its ability to influence UN voting compliance. Wang offers two
explanations for the confusion in results. First, he finds that the previous authors use a
short time span to test for this relationship. He points out that “with these methodological
insufficiencies it would be difficult to observe a general trend in the relationship between
US Foreign aid and UN voting patterns.” Before this study the longest time in any study
was seven non-consecutive years by Rai (1980). The small number of data points made it
difficult to produce conclusive results. The second explanation for the variation in results
is that the analysis is conducted by analyzing every UN resolution without paying any
attention to key or important votes to the US. He conducts a coincidence rating test
between all resolutions from 1984 to 1993 and important issues to see how well the rates
compare to each other. This coincidence rate test examines how often a recipient state
votes the same way as the US for a specific year. Then Wang took the coincidence, or
compliance rate, for all resolutions and compares that percentage to the coincidence rate
for the important votes. He finds that the average coincidence rate for all resolutions
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was 19% while the coincidence rate for the important votes has an average of 55%. From
this preliminary test he finds that looking at the votes that the US labeled as key or
important has a significant effect on the coincidence rate with US votes. The coincidence
rates on important issues also mimic aid when it falls and rises.
After the coincidence rate test, Wang analyzes the effects of US aid on UN voting
patterns. He uses the Department of State data detailing important votes to measure the
dependent variable- important votes coincidence rate. He uses two measures of the
dependent variable. The first is directly from the State Department publications. This
measurement is the coincidence of votes between the US and any aid recipient state for
important resolutions. Absences and abstentions are deleted from the total number of
votes cast by the recipient state. The second alternative measure also uses the
coincidence rate from the State Dept. publications, but instead of ignoring the absences
and abstentions Wang treats them as non-compliant votes. He then includes a lag
variable as a control for each voting coincidence measurement.
The main independent variable in the study was US aid dependence, which Wang
measured with two indicators. The first indicator of aid influence is the amount of total
US aid as a proportion of the total aid each recipient country received. The second
indicator of aid influence is the change of US aid measured by the different amounts of
aid, which tests the effectiveness of increases and decreases in aid allocation by the US to
influence UN voting compliance. He also introduces five other variables because
coincidence could be explained by factors other than the amount of aid a state receives:
level of economic development; military strength; level of democracy; multilateral aid as
a percentage of total aid; the change in multilateral aid; and a control for the break up of
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the Soviet Union. All of the data for these independent variables come from OECD
publications.
Wang’s results from his pooled cross-sectional and time series analysis support
his preliminary findings. He finds that neither of the aid dependence measurements are
statistically significant, as other studies have shown. But, his findings do suggest that
there is a high level of compliance when aid levels are altered. This implies that states do
not respond to the amount of aid they have already received, but when the US changes
the levels of aid allocated as a reward or punishment the levels of compliance in UN
voting shift. Wang’s conclusion is that “During the ten-year period of 1984-1993 the US
government has successfully induced recipient countries into supporting its position in
the General Assembly on important issues by manipulating the levels of Foreign Aid,”
(Wang 1999, 207). He finds that when studying US aid and UN voting compliance other
factors than just simple aid allocations need to be examined. The shift and changes in aid
allocation can cause states to act in accordance with US preferences. Studies that look
only at the amount allocated in a given year would miss the true relationship between US
aid and UN voting.
The above authors have provided an array of different findings that both support
and contradict a relationship between US aid and UN voting. However, Wang (1999)
and Wittkopf’s (1973) findings and analysis provided a clearer picture of the abilities of
US foreign aid to influence UN voting than the studies that did not find a relationship
between aid and voting compliance. Wang (1999) uses a new measurement of the
dependent variable that incorporates important votes instead of all UN resolutions and
finds a significant relationship. This study has the most convincing explanation for the
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contradicting results in these studies. Wang shows that using important votes allows the
researcher to observe the relationship between US aid and UN voting. Wittkopf’s (1973)
findings also suggest that there is a relationship, if only for the US. Since the literature
rests on this study and its findings confirm the relationship between US aid and voting
compliance then the validity of the results are more persuasive than Russett (1967) and
Kegley & Hook (1991) who found no relationship. For these reasons my first hypothesis
is that US Foreign Aid will have a significant relationship with UN voting compliance.
This study will rely on the previous literature to test for the relationship between
US aid and voting compliance. The authors agree upon a 90% unanimous rule that
throws out votes that have over 90% majority, but that may be the extent of the
consensus. There are a few debates that must be examined before any of the variables
can be operationalized. First, and most important, is the lack of consistency or agreement
about voting compliance. There are two areas where authors have disagreed, first is the
use of specific key votes or all resolutions and the second is how to operationalized
abstentions and absences on individual UN votes.
Wittkopf (1973), Rai (1980), and Russett (1967) do not take any measures to
distinguish between important votes to the donor states. Wittkopf (1973) studies the
overall possibility of a relationship, so focusing on specific votes would have been
unnecessary. Also there are 13 donor countries and it would have been nearly impossible
to find the key votes to each individual country or votes that all 13 find important. Rai
(1980) and Kegley and Hook (1991) follow the trend of Wittkopf (1973) because his
study asserts that using all resolutions instead of picking out certain ones was a more
preferable method.
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As important as it is to follow the tradition of the previous literature there is a
significant amount of support to deviate from the norm and use key votes to the US as the
measurement of the dependent variable. Keohane (1967) finds that a country’s interest
will vary from one issue to another and that most votes in the General Assembly are not
of great importance to the US. He finds it unlikely that the US will exert the pressure or
action needed to alter voting behavior on all resolutions. Only on the votes that are in the
US interests will policymakers be willing to apply pressure or coerce changes in voting
behavior. Black (1968) contributes to this line of argument. He finds that the
Department of State places a great deal of importance on foreign aid to alter UN voting
on issues that are key to the US government.
Albert and Bernstein (1974) find that when China’s admission into the UN was
under discussion, a key vote to the American interests, the US used foreign aid as an
influence in the vote. They find a strong and positive relationship over this issue between
US foreign aid and the UN resolutions to allow PR China’s admission. This relationship
might not have been observed if it was included with every other vote from that year.
Kegley and McGowan (1981) indicate that there is a different level of intensity
when the donor country wants to influence voting behavior on salient issues. They write
that the amount of influence a state will apply depends on the priority attached to the
resolution. They also note that labeling issues high and low priority, by the researcher,
may be a crude measurement of the variable. However, this concern is not a valid
concern because the US government, not the researcher, assigns the label of key votes.
Strom Thacker (1999) weighs in on the discussion about important votes being
used instead of every UN resolution. His article is mainly about the IMF and how
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politics affect it, but he includes an informative section about UN voting. He explains
that since 1983 the US Department of State has gathered records on UN voting behavior
of key issues. The government uses these records to assess which states have similar
values with US. Thacker asserts that not all UN resolutions have the same amount of
importance and that there are some votes that will demand more attention from
policymakers. Foreign aid has been a tool that is used by the US to garner compliance in
the past and these important votes in the UN are no exception.
Using key votes to measure the dependent variable in this study is the best way to
examine my hypotheses because previous literature makes a persuasive argument that it
is the best way to operationalize the question. Wang (1999) found that important votes
could account for the discrepancies in the previous literature. Using important or key
votes allows an accurate reflection of US influence. When it matters can the US use its
foreign aid to change voting behavior? That is an important question, one that has not
been fully addressed by previous research because they have looked at every resolution
regardless of its value to the US. If the US does not value the vote or resolution then
there are no expectations on recipient states to comply with the US. Only for the votes
that the US puts value in does the question of aid as leverage come into play. When
researchers use all UN resolutions they are asking if the US can influence voting
compliance even when it does nothing to alter voting behavior. As Thacker (1999) and
Keohane (1967) have shown the US does not put efforts into influencing voting behavior
unless the vote is important to US interests. This means is that the only way to truly
assess if the US can influence UN voting compliance is to look at those instances when
the US actually puts forth the effort to alter the behavior. The US looks at these
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important votes when it decides how much aid to allocate to a given country, not all
votes. Since the US uses these votes to distribute aid, it seems logical that these are the
instances that the relationship between US aid and voting compliance would emerge.
As previous literature has shown it is difficult to find the relationship between US
foreign aid and voting compliance. One reason important votes have not been addressed
is because there has not been a credible source of what the US, or any other country,
deems important. Now that the US State Department has complied reports outlining the
important issues research can be done to examine if the US can alter voting behavior
when it needs to. The reliability of this measure is strong because it is the policymakers
that have labeled the votes they would use foreign aid to influence. Now the actual
question can be addressed on whether or not the US can influence UN voting compliance
with the use of its foreign aid.
The second method that has not been consistent throughout the research is how to
characterize abstentions and absences. The State Department, Wittkopf (1973) and Rai
(1980) consider compliance as an active behavior. What this means is that the recipient
country has to vote with the US in order to be compliant. The Department of State
ignores abstentions and absences in their calculations. If there are 16 votes in a year and
a state misses five of them the government will make the total votes for that country 11,
instead of the full 16. By lowering the amount of votes that are considered this method
gives a much higher level of compliance. Wittkopf (1973) and Rai (1980) look at
abstentions and absences differently. They treat them as non-compliant votes. The idea is
that the US pays for compliance or agreement and not casting a vote does not actively
show agreement.
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The last way to calculating abstentions and absences is by Kegley and McGowan
(1981) and Russett (1967). They consider the option of half compliance or midway
between agreement and disagreement. They find that there is a difference between voting
in opposition to the US and remaining neutral by abstaining. Supported by Zimmerman
(1993) who finds that the US may pay states to not oppose them, this option allows the
possibility that the active support is not always necessary. The US may want to give the
illusion that there is a low level of opposition or the US may not be able to convince a
state to support a resolution so the next best option is to not vote in opposition.
There are convincing arguments for treating abstentions and absences as noncompliance and as half compliance. This study will test both the traditional method of
looking at abstentions and absences as non-compliance as well as the half compliance
method.
While the debate about the measurement of the dependent variable is the most
important there is another disagreement about how US aid is used to influence UN
voting. Two studies found statistical support that show if aid is used as an inducement or
as a reward/punishment. Wang (1999) finds that US aid as a reward/punishment is more
effective in influencing voting compliance. His analysis shows that the US altered aid as
a response to the levels compliance from the previous year. He also asserts that the
recipient states are aware of this relationship and that it dictates their behavior. However,
Rai (1980) finds that the US is able to use inducements, before the votes, to influence
compliance levels.
While none of the articles provide conclusive evidence that the use of aid as an
inducement or as a reward/punishment is more effective, Wang’s (1999) results seem to
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be more convincing. Reward/punishment activities after the votes will be more effective
than inducement activities before the votes. Leaders don’t look at what they already
received and used, but at what else they can get or keep. There is more of an impact
when the US State Department can threaten to take something away or offer more rather
than relying on leaders to remember how much aid the US gave them 8 months before.
Second, rewards/punishments work better because they leave the possibility of
unexploited bargaining power (Wagner 1988). The US can always add to the deal. If
there is another important vote than the US can add a little more to the amount of aid it
gives a country in return for continued compliance. Rewards and punishments retain
their leverage because the possibility of more aid or less aid is looming over the recipient
country’s decision to comply with the US. For these reasons my second hypothesis is
that US Foreign Aid will be more effective as a reward/punishment than as an
inducement.
There have been no previous studies that looked at the different types of aid the
US gives. But there are two different types of aid the US gives: economic aid and
military aid. Each serves a different purpose and therefore may produce different levels
of compliance. Globalization is causing developing nations to fall further and further
behind the developed states. The gap is widening and the need for assistance is trumping
the need to develop a strong military. Some nations will be concerned with military aid,
like the Middle East because of the unstable nature of the region, but those states are a
small portion of the total US aid recipients. Most developing nations rely on foreign aid
to off set the costs of running the country and providing services to the domestic
community, making the influence of aid designated to make the gap between the haves
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and have-nots less prominent more valuable to a country. Another contributing factor is
that allocations of military aid may be used to serve other foreign policy goals, like
regional stability. Since the efforts are not put towards influencing voting compliance the
US will not receive it. These reasons lead me to adopt the third hypothesis that US
economic aid will have more influence on UN voting compliance than military aid.
Since the UN was created there have been strong voting trends and patterns of
alignment. While the US has had some success at influencing UN voting it is important
to define the environment that the US is operating in. There will be regions that comply
with the US the majority of the time and at the same time there will be regions that have
always and will continue to have low compliance with US votes. It is important to
understand which regions have strong patterns because they could have a positive or
negative affect on the findings. The following articles will also lay down the foundation
for my last hypothesis, which states regional variations will produce different levels of
compliance.
As mentioned previously, Rai (1980) finds regional differences in his article that
show Africa and the Middle East/South Asia with very low compliance with the US on in
all variables. Suggesting that these regions will show low levels of compliance. But
Latin America has a strong and positive relationship between the per capita and total aid
as a percentage of total GDP aid variables. Which translates into Latin America showing
more voting compliance with the US.
Kim and Russett (1996) trace the trends and patterns that have formed in the UN
since the Cold War. They look at voting alignments to analyze voting preferences in the
General Assembly across different regions. They examine UN voting records for the 46th
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through the 48th session and find that the North South divide accounts for an
overwhelming amount of variation in voting behavior across regions in the General
Assembly. During the Cold War there was a strong East-West divide that separated
communist countries from the democratic West. Until recently this divide dominated the
voting alignments. However, this divide has been replaced with one that puts the Global
South, represented by developing nations, against the Global North, comprised of the
highly developed countries.
Kim and Russett (1996) also warn that economic ties with the US can result in
two different types of voting behavior. The first is that US aid may create feelings of
economic exploitation, while the second possible reaction is a positive influence on
voting compliance with the US. Unfortunately, Kim and Russet do not tell the context
that will result in each of the outcomes they simply give a general warning that using aid
as a tool of influencing voting compliance could have adverse effects.
Joe Hagan (1989) finds that systemic variables like foreign aid have a strong
influence on UN voting alignment in the Third World, which are contrary to the findings
above. He originally hypothesizes that the regimes in Third World nations would explain
the variance in UN voting, but his results support the opposite idea. He finds that over
half of the UN voting variance has nothing to do with the regime type, but external
factors like aid allocations. What this article shows is that US foreign aid is capable of
influencing the Third World to comply in UN voting because it is the systemic variables
apart from the regime type that dictate UN voting behavior. He also finds that there are
no Third World alignments in the majority of his cases, which negates the idea that
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regions or individual states do have trends or patterns. Hagan fails to find any tie that the
Third World has that would signify some kind of voting alignment of the Global South.
Based on the literature I anticipate seeing regional variations for Africa, Asia,
Middle East, Eurasia (Former USSR), Latin America, and Eastern Europe when
compared to Western Europe. 5 I expect to see Africa, the Middle East, and Asia with
more negative and statistically significant relationships with US compliance than W.
Europe. African and Asian countries receive moderate amounts of aid with the exception
of a few strategically important states and one reason why these regions will not comply
with the US is because there is no real incentive. The US does not allocate enough aid
for these regions to become dependent, which means that the US has little leverage over
their voting compliance. Another factor that produces low voting compliance is the
voting alignments that already exist. Kim and Russett (1996) write that developing
nations will band together and create voting alliances or groups that support their
interests, not the most developed countries. Many developing nations are in Africa and
Asia, which makes their interests and voting compliance much different than US
interests. Since the US does not make a strong effort to influence voting compliance with
aid Africa and Asia will not comply with the US on important UN votes.
The Middle East will not have any positive and significant relationships with US
voting compliance, but for a different reason. The countries in this region have enough
natural resources that they have more potential to support themselves than some of the
other regions. Secondly, there are ideological differences that will contribute to the
Middle East exhibiting lower levels of compliance than W. Europe. The last reason is

5

Listed in Appendix II
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that the US does not allocate aid resources to compel voting compliance. Palmer,
Wohlander, and Morgan (2002) argue that the US may not always use its resources to
alter voting behavior. For the Middle East aid allocations are to facilitate regional
stability, not alter UN voting compliance. The US will not see high levels of voting
compliance from this region because their resources are not being used to reach that goal.
One region that will have an increased chance of a few statistically significant and
positive relationships with US voting compliance when compared to W. Europe is
Eurasia. The main reason Eurasia will have this mid-level compliance with the US is the
Cold War. Kim and Russet (1996) explained how the East-West voting divide in the UN
diminished to give way to other UN voting alignments. When this divide eroded so did
the stark non-compliant voting behavior of the Former USSR allowing the US an
opportunity to use its aid to influence voting compliance. Lai (2003) writes that after the
Cold War the practice of using aid to influence behavior to comply with US interests
became even more important. After the fall of the Soviet Union the US was able to use
aid resources to influence the region to voting compliance. The additional attention and
resources distributed to this region should erode the East-West divide. The Post Cold
War relationship between the US and Eurasia will alter the voting compliance levels so
that this region will be closer to the W. Europe levels of compliance.
The two regions that will be more likely to have positive and statistically
significant relationships when analyzed against W. Europe are Latin America and Eastern
Europe. Latin America will have high levels of voting compliance because aid is an
effective influence to the countries in this region. America puts a lot of resources in the
form of aid towards influencing voting behavior in this region. Palmer et al. (2002)

28

argues that compliance is heavily dependent on how many resources are used to alter
voting behavior. The US allocates large amounts of aid to Latin America because it is
strategically important.

Hagan (1989) addresses the second reason why this region will

have high compliance when he argues that non-regime variables, like foreign aid, are
more important than any existing voting alignments. The ties that Latin America has
with international or regional organizations are not strong enough to dissuade Latin
American countries to comply with the US. For these two reason I believe that there will
be high levels of voting compliance in Latin America.
Eastern Europe will also have strong correlation with UN voting compliance
because the US continues to contribute aid to this region regardless of their need, which
is small. Even though the aid amounts are small they can still serve to strengthen ties
between Europe and the US. Ruttan (1996) asserts that aid is given to strengthen the
political commitments of the recipient country to the donor state. Aid contributes to the
friendly relationship between E. Europe and the US and high compliance is a by-product
of the two factors.
The literature on US foreign aid and UN voting compliance is still at the
beginning stages. There are many debates when analyzing the ability of aid to affect UN
voting about measurement, method and even findings. Studies began by looking at all
donor states and have progressed to look just at the US, which has allowed more in depth
analysis. The latest addition in the literature on methodology is the inclusion of
important votes, which are argued to operationalize the question better than other
measurements. There is another group of literature that has persuasively argued that the
US can and has influenced UN voting compliance, and others argue that altering voting
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behavior is the purpose of US foreign aid. Then there are other authors that argue that
regional variations may affect how well US aid can influence voting compliance.
Even though the literature for this research question is young, it has contributed to
the four hypotheses I will test. First, US foreign aid will have a statistically significant
relationship with UN voting compliance on important votes. Second, economic aid will
have more influence than military aid. Third, US foreign aid will be more effective in
influencing voting compliance through rewards/ punishments instead of inducements.
Lastly, regional variations in voting compliance will emerge. In the next section I will
explain in detail how I will set up and analyze the six models that will test for the
relationships expected in each hypothesis. I will also describe the independent variables I
will use to examine each hypothesis and what methodology I will use to test for
correlations.
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Chapter 3 Data and Method
To test the four hypotheses in this thesis I will analyze the voting compliance on
important votes for 149 US aid recipient countries6 in the United Nations General
Assembly from 1984-2002.7 The dependent variable in this study is voting compliance
with the US on UN Resolutions that the Department of State has labeled important votes.
The important vote data comes from annual reports submitted to Congress on voting
patterns in the UN.
The Greenbook data that I use in this study is a different source of data than some
of the previous studies. Since I am looking at one donor country I am able to use the
donor country’s sources of aid amounts allocated. This data encompasses all of the aid
allocation programs in place for each recipient country and will vary across region and
state. Other data sources, like the OECD data take into consideration how the aid is used
or consumed by the recipient state, if the aid is used to purchase goods from the donor
country or if the aid is able to be used for goods from any country. My data makes no
differentiation between different uses of aid, it is simply a total amount of aid allocated
from the US to an individual recipient country.
Two measures of the dependent variable will be operationalized because there is a
debate in the literature about how to treat abstentions and absences. By using two voting
compliance measures I can compare the results between the two variables in order to see
which variable is better for this topic. Another benefit is that I will be able to observe
more relationships and trends than if I were using only one of the compliance variables.
6

List of countries in Appendix I
65 countries will have the full 19years of analysis, the other countries will have less due to data
constraints and admittance into the UN.

7
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Both compliance measurements exclude important votes that were passed with a 90%
unanimous vote or more.
To begin I will calculate modified compliance, the first compliance rate.
Modified compliance8 measures abstentions and absences as half compliance. For each
year I will take every important vote and assign it a number that represents the status of
compliance: 0 for non-compliance, 1 for half compliance (abstentions/absences), and 2
for compliance. Then I will add all of the modified compliance status numbers for each
year. Next I will divide the year sum by double the amount of important votes for that
year. This process will produce a modified compliance rate for one year between 0 and
1. The last step is to multiply the compliance rate by 100 in order to make a larger scale
to work with.
Example Slovenia 2002 for Modified Compliance:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Modified Compliance status numbers: 2 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 2
2002 yearly sum: 12
Number of important votes in 2002: 9
Divide yearly sum by double the number of important votes in 2002:
12/(9*2)=.667
5. Modified Compliance rate for Slovenia in 2002: .667
6. Multiply by 100: 66.67
For the second compliance rate, labeled traditional compliance9, I will use the
method employed by previous authors. This method treats abstentions and absences as
non-compliance. To calculate this measure I will take the important votes for each year
and assign a 0 for non-compliance, absences and abstentions and a 2 for compliance. I
will follow the same procedure as above to produce a traditional compliance rate between

8
9

Kegley and McGowan (1981) and Russett (1967) measured abstentions and absences as half compliance
Wittkopf (1973) and Rai (1980) measured abstentions and absences as non-compliance.
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0 and 1. The last step is to multiply the compliance rate by 100 in order to make a larger
scale to work with.
Example Slovenia 2002 for Traditional Compliance:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Traditional compliance status number: 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2
2002 yearly sum: 10
Number of important votes in 2002: 9
Divide yearly sum by double the number of important votes in 2002:
10/(2*9)=.556
5. Traditional Compliance rate for Slovenia in 2002: .556
6. Multiply by 100: 55.56

Data for the amount of aid allocated to each country comes from the US
Department of State Greenbook. The aid data is split into total US aid, total economic
aid, and total military aid. For the aid data I will control for wealth of a country, to take
into account the fact that the same amount of aid will have different effects on smaller
countries and bigger states. To do this each aid category will be divided by the country’s
GDP.10 This will produce three new variables labeled total adjusted US aid, adjusted
economic aid, and adjusted military aid. This analysis will test both sets of aid
variables because the weighted and unweighted aid measurements test different ideas.
The unweighted variables analyze how beneficial the aid amounts look on paper or to the
policymaker while the weighted variables examines if policymakers bargain for enough
aid to contribute to the domestic economy.
For each of the six aid variables I will calculate a change in aid variable. By
using change in aid variables the Wang (1999) and Rai (1980) findings have been able to
examine the relationship between aid as an inducement or as a reward/punishment. Since

10

GDP data comes from the World Bank 2002 World Development Indicators.
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these are the variables that provide support for their studies it is important to use them in
any study that seeks to add to their work.
Four additional variables will be incorporated into this analysis. They have been
used in previous studies as additional explanatory variables. The first is US aid as a
percentage of the total aid a country receives. This measurement reflects how
dependent a recipient country is on US aid for external assistance. If the US gives a high
percentage of total aid then I expect to see more compliance, but if the US gives a small
percentage than there will be less compliance. The second variable is the percent of
multilateral aid of the total amount of aid a state receives. This measures how much
of the recipient’s aid comes from groups of donors, which take away the opportunity for
the US to bargain for voting compliance. The more multilateral forms of aid the less
dependent or reliant a state is on one individual country, which means an individual
donor could not exert leverage over the recipient state. The third variable is the level of
democracy. The scale for this variable spans from –10 as the opposite of a democracy to
10 being the most democratic state. The last variable will control for the effect of the
Cold War. This is a dummy variable, labeled Cold War, which assigns a 1 for the years
during the Cold War and a 0 for the years after. The data for the first two variables
comes from the OECD and the data for the third variable comes from the polity2
measurement of democracy in the Polity IV Project from the University of Maryland
This thesis will test four hypotheses. The first is that US foreign aid has a
positive and significant influence on UN voting compliance for important votes. To
examine this hypothesis two OLS regression models will be constructed. The first
regression model will use modified voting compliance with US as the dependent variable.
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The second regression model will use traditional voting compliance as the dependent
variable. In both models the independent variables will be total US aid, total adjusted US
aid, change in total aid, and change in total adjusted aid. Four additional variables will be
included in the analysis: percent of US aid in total aid, percent multilateral aid in total
aid, level of democracy, and Cold War. By using these models I will be able to find and
describe the relationship between two or more of the variables for both compliance
measurements. I expect to find total adjusted US aid with the strongest statistically
significant relationships.
The second hypothesis argues that economic aid will have more influence on UN
voting compliance than military aid. I will construct two additional models for this
hypothesis. The first model will include the modified compliance variable and the
second model will use the traditional compliance variable. I will run standard OLS
regression to analyze this hypothesis. Both models will include all eight of the economic
and military aid variables: economic aid, military aid, adjusted economic aid, adjusted
military aid, change in economic aid, change in military aid, change in adjusted economic
aid, and change in adjusted military aid. Percent of US aid in total aid, percent
multilateral aid in total aid, the level of democracy, and Cold War control will also be
included in these models. I expect the results to show that economic aid variables will
have stronger and more statistically significant results than military aid variables.
The third hypothesis tests if US aid works better as an inducement or a
reward/punishment. To analyze this pattern I will create two more models that will lead
of the aid variables one year and include the change in aid variables. I will lead the aid
variables by putting all of the aid values ahead one year. This examines if aid was given
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before the resolutions to induce the recipient state to vote in compliance with the US. I
will use the change in aid variables to test the effects after the votes. Instead of using a
lag, which simply puts the amount a recipient state receives, the change in aid variables
measure if the aid was increased or decreased after the votes. This will allow me to test if
high levels of compliance resulted in aid increases and low levels of compliance returned
aid decreases or if high levels of compliance produced decreases in aid. I expect to see
the change in aid variables with more statistically significant relationships, which will
indicate that the US is more influential when it uses aid as a reward/punishment.
The last hypothesis looks at regional trends and patterns. Based on the
Department of State categories I will divide the recipient countries into 6 different
regions and create a dummy variable for each region. Next, I will analyze each region’s
voting compliance level by comparing them to the voting compliance level of Western
Europe. This allows me to examine which region will be more likely to have higher or
lower compliance levels than Western Europe. I will review the findings from the
preceding models to examine the regional variations. I expect to see Latin America and
Eastern Europe with the more positive and significant levels of voting compliance than
W. Europe. Eurasia will have the middle level of compliance, while Africa, Asia and the
Middle East will have no positive and significant relationship with UN voting compliance
when compared to W. Europe.
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Chapter 4 Findings
The first hypothesis, which tested for the relationship between US foreign aid and
UN voting compliance, was supported by the findings. Total adjusted US aid had positive
and significant results showing that US aid does influence UN voting compliance for
both modified compliance (Table 1) and traditional compliance (Table 2). The results
suggest that as the US gives more aid to a recipient country that state’s level of
compliance will raise. These findings imply that US aid is effective at influencing
voting behavior when it actually contributes to the recipient country’s economy. Total
US aid does not alter voting compliance because it lacks leverage. The absence or
presence of the unweighted total US aid measure does not change the domestic
environment, but the total adjusted US aid can hurt or help the recipient country by taking
away or giving more aid, giving it much more leverage. The recipient state will be much
more dependent when US aid has a heavy impact on the domestic economy.
Policymakers will be more willing to comply with the US when non-compliance can
create a negative domestic response when the economy suffers because there is less US
aid flowing in. Total adjusted US aid was expected to have more influence because aid
can influence much more if it has a sufficient amount of leverage over the recipient state.
Not only does the aid amount appeal to the policymakers, but the US can rely upon the
domestic community to apply additional pressure to keep aid flows coming in, which
gives the US more power over that states voting behavior. The unweighted measure
cannot test the effect of US aid in a country and therefore is not able to observe the
relationship between the state’s dependence on US aid when it affects the economy and
the leverage it gives the US in voting compliance.
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Table 1. Total Aid Variables and Modified Compliance

Variable

b

se

t-ratio

Prob.

Total US Aid

.000

.000

.051

.959

Total Adjusted US Aid

.000146

.000

3.708

.000***

Change in Total US Aid

.014

.000

.969

.333

Change in Total Adjusted US Aid

-.000

.000

-1.577

.115

%US Aid of Total Recipient Aid

-.044

.002

-.246

.806

%Multi. Aid of Total Recipient Aid .031

.002

.179

.858

Democracy

.240

.001

2.351

.019**

Cold War

-7.181

.012

-.6070

.000***

Middle East

-7.151

.038

-1.872

.062**

Africa

-9.689

.032

-3.019

.003***

Latin America

2.875

.031

.924

.356

Asia

-10.877

.033

-3.305

.001***

Eurasia

-1.529

.045

-.377

.736

Eastern Europe

29.779

.086

3.477

.001***

N=
R Squared=
Adj. R Sq.=

***
**
*

1186
.171
.159

prob. < 0.01, one-tailed test
prob. < 0.05, one-tailed test
prob. < 0.10, one-tailed test
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Table 2. Total Aid Variables and Traditional Compliance

Variable

b

se

t-ratio

Prob.

Total Aid

.002

.000

.962

.336

Total Adjusted Aid

.000122

.000

2.845

.005***

Change in Total Aid

-.005

.000

-.345

.730

Change in Total Adjusted Aid

-.000

.000

-.209

.834

%US of Total

.104

.002

.530

.596

%Multilateral of Total

-.211

.002

-1.112

.267

Democracy

.409

.001

3.662

.000***

Cold War

10.871

.013

8.405

.000***

Middle East

-9.963

.042

-2.385

.017**

Africa

-11.360

.035

-3.238

.001***

Latin America

5.066

.034

1.490

.137

Asia

-12.607

.036

-3.504

.000***

Eurasia

-8.663

.050

-1.748

.081*

Eastern Europe

30.495

.094

3.258

.001***

N=
R Squared=
Adj. R Sq.=

***
**
*

1186
.243
.234

prob. < 0.01, one-tailed test
prob. < 0.05, one-tailed test
prob. < 0.10, one-tailed test
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Democracy had a significant effect in modified compliance (Table 1) and
traditional compliance (Table 2) models. The democracy findings indicate that the level
of democracy will predict the level of voting compliance. Mousseau (2000) argues that
democracies have similar interests because of their “political interests derive from their
socioeconomic norms.” (Mousseau 2000, 472) This implies that the high correlation with
democracies and voting compliance is based off of shared interests, not because of any
aid variables.
The Cold War measure has conflicting findings for modified compliance and
traditional compliance. The Cold War variable was significant and negative suggesting
that during the Cold War we are likely to find less modified voting compliance or less
half compliance. (Table 1) The Cold War variable has the expected effect on modified
compliance because it shows that the Cold War had a negative correlation with voting
compliance. However, the Cold War variable had a significant and positive correlation
with traditional compliance, which implies that the Cold War increased voting
compliance when only active compliance was measured. (Table 2) The fact that the Cold
War variable had both a positive and negative effect on compliance could be attributed to
the different measurements of compliance.
The last variables in these models were the % of US aid of total aid received and
% multilateral aid of total aid received. The % US aid of total aid received had a
negative direction when correlated with compliance. This means that the proportion of
aid that comes from the US is unimportant in voting compliance, what matters is how
much the US gives independent of other sources of aid. The % multilateral aid of total
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aid received with a negative direction when correlated with traditional compliance. This
model shows multilateral aid in the anticipated direction indicating a negative
relationship with compliance.
The regional control variables will be discussed later. However, these results
provide support to the hypothesis that US foreign aid does influence UN voting
compliance. These findings do not explain the entire amount of variation in voting
compliance they can account for almost 25%. The models show that total adjusted US
aid and democracy can explain and predict the levels of compliance a recipient state will
have.
The second hypothesis produced vastly different results from model to model
making it difficult to determine if economic aid has more influence than military aid on
compliance. Table 3 shows that economic aid has a significant and negative effect on
modified compliance, which were unexpected. Suggesting that the more economic aid
allocated the less voting compliance the US will see. One explanation for these results is
the large amounts of economic aid the US allocates to Middle Eastern, African, and
Asian countries and their low voting compliance levels. Since these regions do not
comply with the US but continue to receive aid it appears as if the US pays for noncompliance.
The findings for adjusted economic aid are positive and significant, the opposite
of economic aid. (Table 3) These findings are not contradictory, in fact they paint a clear
picture that economic aid is effective in influencing voting compliance, but only when the
aid actually contributes to society. When the US gives small allocations of economic aid
it has a negative effect because the recipient state does not see the aid helping the
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Table 3. Change in Aid Variables and Modified Compliance

Variable

b

se

t-ratio

Prob.

Economic Aid

-.037

.000

-3.117

.002***

Military Aid

.020

.000

2.265

.024**

Adjusted Economic Aid

.000161

.000

2.884

.004***

Adjusted Military Aid

.000487

.000

2.881

.004***

Changes In Economic Aid

.028

.000

1.652

.099*

Changes In Military Aid

.056

.000

1.595

.111

Changes in Adjusted Economic Aid -.000145

.000

-1.774

.076**

Changes in Adjusted Military Aid

-.000

.000

-1.492

.136

%US of Total Aid

-.023

.002

-.128

.898

%Multilateral of Total Aid

.029

.002

.170

.865

Democracy

.314

.001

3.010

.003***

Cold War

-6.897

.012

-5.686

.000***

Middle East

-6.232

.038

-1.621

.105

Africa

-8.201

.032

-2.532

.011**

Latin America

4.518

.032

1.433

.152

Asia

-7.613

.034

-2.222

.026**

Eurasia

.805

.046

.176

.861

Eastern Europe

30.898

.086

3.61

.000***

N=
R Squared=
Adj. R Sq.=

***
**
*

1166
.187
.175

prob. < 0.01, one-tailed test
prob. < 0.05, one-tailed test
prob. < 0.10, one-tailed test
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Table 4. Change in Variables and Traditional Compliance

Variable

b

se

t-ratio

Prob.

Economic Aid

-.004

.000

-.307

.759

Military Aid

-.000

.000

-.094

.925

Adjusted Economic Aid

.000

.000

.968

.333

Adjusted Military Aid

.000498

.000

2.682

.007***

Changes In Economic Aid

-.013

.000

-.704

.482

Changes In Military Aid

.061

.000

1.596

.111

Changes in Adjusted Economic Aid .000

.000

.360

.719

Changes in Adjusted Military Aid

-.000728

.000

-2.304

.021**

%US of Total Aid

.116

.002

.581

.561

%Multilateral of Total Aid

-.208

.002

-1.089

.277

Democracy

.446

.001

3.903

.000***

Cold War

10.467

.013

7.869

.000***

Middle East

-10.063

.042

-2.387

.017**

Africa

-10.483

.036

-2.952

.003***

Latin America

5.343

.035

1.546

.122

Asia

-11.942

.038

-3.178

.002***

Eurasia

-7.868

.050

-1.566

.118

Eastern Europe

30.763

.094

3.278

.001***

N=
R Squared=
Adj. R Sq.=

***
**
*

1166
.246
.234

prob. < 0.01, one-tailed test
prob. < 0.05, one-tailed test
prob. < 0.10, one-tailed test
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domestic environment. Once the economic aid has saturated the domestic economy the
recipient state is much more likely to comply in UN votes. The adjusted economic aid
findings support my hypothesis that US economic aid is more effective in influencing
voting compliance.
Both military aid and adjusted military aid had significant findings in this
analysis. In Table 3 we see that military aid has a strong, positive, and significant
influence on modified compliance, which indicates that military aid also has influence
over modified compliance. This relationship is strong and shows that even when the
military aid does not affect the recipient state’s economy it is influential.
The findings for adjusted military aid showed that it had a positive and significant
effect on both modified compliance (Table 3) and traditional compliance (Table 4).
These findings imply that the more military aid saturates the recipient’s economy the
more compliant it will be. While this aid variable was expected to be less influential it is
logical that adjusted military aid had high levels of influence on voting compliance. The
US is much more discriminating when it allocates military aid so the US may be able to
ask for more in return, like assured voting compliance. With military aid the US has
power over the recipient’s military capabilities because the US can help make it stronger
or allow the recipient’s military might to remain the same. The US can easily turn this
power into influence over modified and traditional voting compliance.
The results to hypothesis 2 are more than what was expected because the analysis
found that both economic and military aid can effectively yield influence over voting
compliance, one is not more effective than the other. The two aid variables that had the
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Table 5. Lead Aid Variables and Modified Compliance

Variable

b

se

t-ratio

Prob.

Lead Economic Aid

-.031

.012

-2.594

.010***

Lead Military Aid

.014

.009

1.601

.110

Lead Adjusted Economic Aid

.000148

.000

2.607

.009***

Lead Adjusted Military Aid

.000539

.000

2.857

.004***

Changes In Economic Aid

.012

.017

.714

.475

Changes In Military Aid

.035

.036

.979

.328

Changes in Adjusted Economic Aid -.000

.000

-.924

.356

Changes in Adjusted Military Aid

-.000

.000

-.954

.341

%US of Total Aid

.094

.195

.480

.631

%Multilateral of Total Aid

.016

.177

.088

.930

Democracy

.270

.107

2.522

.012***

Cold War

-7.945

1.245

-6.380

.000***

Middle East

-5.684

4.042

-1.406

.160

Africa

-7.946

3.400

-2.337

.020**

Latin America

4.802

3.309

1.451

.147

Asia

-7.198

3.586

-2.007

.045**

Eurasia

-.352

4.946

-.071

.943

Eastern Europe

26.928

9.617

2.800

.005***

N=
R Squared=
Adj. R Sq.=

***
**
*

1095
.179
.165

prob. < 0.01, one-tailed test
prob. < 0.05, one-tailed test
prob. < 0.10, one-tailed test
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Table 6. Lead Variables and Traditional Compliance

Variable

b

se

t-ratio

Prob.

Lead Economic Aid

-.003

.013

-.230

.818

Lead Military Aid

-.002

.010

-.199

.842

Lead Adjusted Economic Aid

.000104

.000

1.693

.091*

Lead Adjusted Military Aid

.000458

.000

2.242

.025**

Changes In Economic Aid

-.024

.019

-1.270

.204

Changes In Military Aid

.043

.039

1.120

.263

Changes in Adjusted Economic Aid .000

.000

1.094

.274

Changes in Adjusted Military Aid

-.000632

.000

-2.095

.036**

%US of Total Aid

.217

.211

1.027

.304

%Multilateral of Total Aid

-.217

.191

-1.136

.256

Democracy

.400

.116

3.455

.001***

Cold War

9.126

1.347

6.774

.000***

Middle East

-8.248

4.373

-1.886

.060*

Africa

-9.367

3.678

-2.546

.011**

Latin America

5.978

3.580

1.670

.095*

Asia

-10.221

3.879

-2.635

.009***

Eurasia

-7.563

5.351

-1.413

.158

Eastern Europe

24.677

10.403

2.372

.018**

N=
R Squared=
Adj. R Sq.=

***
**
*

1095
.222
.209

prob. < 0.01, one-tailed test
prob. < 0.05, one-tailed test
prob. < 0.10, one-tailed test
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most consistent results are adjusted economic aid because its significance and influence
remained consistent over the two models of modified compliance and adjusted military
aid kept its strong and significant influence over both modified and traditional
compliance.
The third hypothesis supports the effective use of aid as an inducement and aid as
a reward/punishment. This analysis tells which aid variables can and cannot be used in
inducement or reward/punishment activities. The first is lead economic aid, which has a
strong, significant and negative relationship with modified compliance. (Table 5) This
finding suggests that when economic aid is used to coerce future voting compliance or
even half compliance it will have the opposite effect. This is the only lead unweighted
aid variable to have a significant effect on compliance and it implies that unweighted aid
used to induce voting behavior will have an adverse effect on UN voting compliance.
The next two aid variables both had significant and positive correlations with
modified compliance at the .01 level. (Table 5) Adjusted lead economic aid and adjusted
lead military aid are effective in inducing voting compliance when they are allocated
before the vote. These findings suggest that inducements do work and are successful in
getting voting compliance. These results are not what I expected and do not support my
hypothesis. However, inducements may be effective because the policymakers have the
aid in their possession and do not have to wait. Also, inducements make it easier for the
leaders of in the recipient countries to justify their voting behavior to their governments
and citizens because they see and are enjoying the benefits now.
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Table 3 shows that my hypothesis was not completely wrong. Change in
economic aid is positive and significant, but not strong. This finding implies that when
economic aid is used as a reward or punishment it will influence the amount of modified
compliance a recipient state has. These results support my hypothesis and meet
expectations that adjustments in aid after the votes would be effective in altering voting
compliance.
There were more variables whose findings were unexpected because they show
rewards and punishments with a negative correlation with compliance. Change in
adjusted economy was significant, but has a negative correlation with modified voting
compliance. (Table 3) These results suggest that using adjusted economic aid as a reward
or punishment has an adverse effect on compliance levels. Change in adjusted military
aid had a significant and negative effect on traditional voting compliance. (Table 6)
These results also show that when adjusted military aid is altered in response to previous
voting behavior it will have a negative effect on the amount of compliance the recipient
state will have.
This analysis provided three important conclusions, first that inducements can be
effective when the aid will contribute to the recipient’s economy. When the US can
provide the benefits in the present then decision makers are much more likely to comply
with the US in UN voting. Second, that the unweighted economic aid variables have
much different relationships with voting compliance than the other aid variables. It is the
only significant lead aid variable that has a negative effect and the only significant
change in aid variable that has a positive effect on voting compliance. The third
conclusion from these results is that there is a negative effect when the US alters aid and
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it affects the recipient’s economy. Both significant adjusted aid variables had negative
relationships with UN voting compliance. Kim and Russett (1996) suggest that there is a
potential for the recipient state to develop sentiments of economic exploitation and
respond negatively when aid is used as leverage. Economic exploitation is apparently
only felt when aid is used as reward or punishment not when aid is given beforehand as
an inducement.
The last hypothesis tested to find the regional variations in UN voting
compliance. Most of the results support the anticipated compliance levels, with the
exception of Eurasia. The Middle East, Africa and Asia have no compliance with the US,
in fact they all have negative correlations with both modified and traditional compliance
when compared to Western Europe. The Middle East has many strong, significant and
negative findings that tell us that these countries do not comply with the US.
Africa exhibits negative, correlations with voting compliance, the opposite of
Western Europe’s voting compliance variation, as expected. These results provide
overwhelming support that Africa has a negative relationship with both half compliance
and active compliance. The negative compliance can be attributed to the abundance of
developing nations in this region, unlike Western Europe that consists of highly
industrialized states, Africa is the core of the Global South, making their interests almost
of the opposite of the US.
The results for Asia are very strong, negative and highly significant, more than
half of the findings are significant at the .01 level. These findings show that this region is
the most likely to have a negative compliance level when measured against Western
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Europe. Many Asian countries are developing and may already have ties with UN voting
alignments that have more influence than US aid, like the Global South.
The next region was expected to have positive and significant relationships with
US voting compliance when weigh against Western Europe, but Eurasia’s findings had
significant and negative influence on traditional compliance. (Table 2) There are two
explanations for this negative correlation with voting compliance. The first is that there
could be remnants of the Cold War mentality where the USSR did not support or comply
with US interests. The East West division may have faded at the end of the Cold War,
but the Former Soviet states have developed ties amongst themselves that may continue
some of the same trends of non-compliant voting behavior from the past. Second, the US
does not give these regions enough aid to get leverage over the recipient states and
influence voting compliance. These two factors cause Eurasia’s voting compliance
variation to be negative when examined against Western Europe.
Latin America is the first of two regions that were expected to have higher levels
of compliance with the US than Western Europe. Latin America had one positive and
significant finding, which supports my hypothesis and shows that countries in this region
have a strong and positive relationship with traditional compliance. (Table 6) However,
it is surprising that there are not more significant findings because Latin America
receives the second highest amount of total aid and has many non-aid ties to the US.
The findings indicate that Eastern Europe is much more likely to have higher
compliance levels than Western Europe shown by the positive and highly significant
findings in every model for both modified compliance and traditional compliance.
Nearly all of the findings are significant at the .01 level and have large b scores which
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detail how strong and significant Eastern Europe’s correlation with voting compliance.
These results support the hypothesis for this region and show that Eastern Europe has a
positive correlation with all voting compliance measures.
The results for the regional analysis meet almost all expectations. The results
show that Eurasia still has a more likely negative relationship with voting compliance
than W. Europe despite the end of the Cold War and aid allocations by the US. .The
regional study tried to account for factors other than aid that contribute to voting
compliance like how developed the country is, existing voting alignments, past voting
behavior effecting current voting compliance, and the purpose of the aid other than voting
compliance.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
The process of allocating foreign aid in the US is complicated because there are
many factors that play a role in who gets aid and why. Previous authors have found that
the US does use aid to influence state’s behavior, but there is still much debate over
whether or not that influence extends to UN voting. However, this thesis has shown that
one factor in this process is UN voting compliance. My analysis has found statistically
significant support that US foreign aid does influence both measures of UN voting
compliance. When the total amount of US aid is enough to affect the recipient state’s
economy the US can effectively alter UN voting behavior. This study covered a longer
amount of time and included over two times the amount of countries in Wang’s (1999)
study, which had the largest amount of recipient states in the literature. Also this thesis
used US Department of State Greenbook data for the aid allocations, which allowed me
to test the effects of each form of aid more in-depth. This study was much more
comprehensive than other studies and has found strong support for each of the hypothesis
tested.
One contribution my work has made is to operationalize two compliance
measures that include only important votes to the US. Using two measures of voting
compliance allowed me to examine if the US used aid for half compliance and active
compliance. Modified compliance measured if the US used aid to avoid oppositional
votes and garner half compliance. This measure has not been the dominant choice in
recent literature, but my study showed that there is a place in this subject for half
compliance because it appears to be effected by US foreign aid. Traditional compliance
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was able to gauge if active compliance was the main concern of the US. This
measurement is important in these analyses and is capable of observing different
relationships than modified compliance. It is difficult to make a conclusion about which
measure is better to analyze this question because they both yielded important findings
and occasionally opposite results. The most that can be concluded is that both measures
should be considered in these studies. Future researchers could study the use of half
compliance and active compliance more to find the merits and faults of both.
Important votes are a somewhat new way to measure voting compliance because
nearly all of the other researchers conducted multiple donor studies, which did not allow
the author to use votes that are important to each individual donor. Finding and studying
important votes to the US has allowed me to fully examine if the US can influence voting
behavior when it wanted or needed voting compliance. My thesis has added to the
literature by operationalizing important votes with different measures of compliance and
showing how effective it is in observing the relationship between US aid and UN voting.
Some of the non-aid variables did have strong relationships with voting
compliance. Democracies had a significant and positive relationship with voting
compliance in every model. This study found that democratic countries are much more
compliant with the US and the less democratic a state is the less compliant they will be.
This is expected because democracies share many similar interests, which would make
their voting in the UN parallel to the US.
The Cold War had a much more complicated relationship with compliance. The
Cold War was negatively related to modified compliance, but a positive relationship with
traditional compliance in every model. These findings suggest that the Cold War
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produced active compliance, not half compliance. The lines were so divided in the UN
that states were either on one side or the other, which made active compliance levels
higher because the US had many more allies in the UN than the USSR.
This thesis also tested to find the effects that economic aid and military aid had on
voting compliance. This is the first US aid and UN voting study to analyze the different
forms of aid. Most studies have used the OECD data to conduct these analyses, but that
data source does not break the aid into different forms for each donor state. The two aid
types may have different effects on voting compliance. I found that they both play a role
in altering voting behavior for modified compliance, but only adjusted military aid
influenced traditional compliance. These results show that both types of aid can
influence half compliance, but it takes a specific kind of aid to get full active compliance.
Military aid is allocated more cautiously than economic aid and it may come with more
demands for the recipient. But even with the added leverage with military aid both play
an important role in influencing UN voting compliance and therefore are both important
to study. However, future researchers could look at the specific effects that each type has
in each region and during peacetime vs wartime.
In the literature there has been another debate that asks if US aid is used as an
inducement or a reward/punishment. Few studies have found support for one side or the
other and the studies that have found results are inconsistent. My study was able to find
how each aid variable affected voting compliance, which provided an array of different
results. The general trend is that rewards and punishments will generally have adverse
effects on the level of compliance, while inducements are much more effective in
coercing voting compliance. I found that when rewards/punishments are used and it
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affects the recipient state’s economy it will have negative influence on voting
compliance, but inducements have positive relationship on voting compliance and are
able to alter behavior. The most interesting finding is that unweighted economic aid had
the most unexpected effect on both measurements of compliance. It had the opposite
results of the trend, meaning that it had a negative effect on compliance when it was used
as an inducement and a positive influence on compliance when it was used in
reward/punishment activities. Another contribution this study made was to break down
the effects of the different forms of aid as inducements and rewards/punishments because
we can see that they have vastly different effects. These results show that this particular
question is a difficult one to address and that future research should be done to examine
the relationship further.
The regional analysis that I conducted supported the regional variations that
previous authors have found. Although, Eurasia has not had much analysis done on it
after the fall of the Soviet Union. The compliance levels are not much different than that
of the Former USSR shown by Eurasia’s significant and negative correlation with voting
compliance. Africa, Asia and the Middle East had negative correlations with voting
compliance, which means that these regions vote the opposite of the US in important UN
resolutions. These three regions were expected to have no compliance with the US
because there are other influences contending with the US for leverage in these regions
despite the fact that they are in the top four regions in total US aid allocations. Latin
America and Eastern Europe both had positive and significant relationships with voting
compliance. There are different reasons for this. First Latin America receives the second
highest amount of aid allocations and it has been effective in influencing voting
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compliance. Eastern Europe has many democracies, which have a high correlation with
voting compliance so this region most likely has similar interests to the US. Regional
studies should be conducted often because changes in the international environment can
create new voting alignments and possibly new cleavages based on criteria other than
borders or development levels.
In the future the UN will continue to be an important forum for the international
community. Its importance to the US will increase so questioning how and if the US uses
its economic resources to direct the decisions of the UN will continue to be vital.
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Appendix A
Countries in the Study
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Africa
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Costa Rica
Cote
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech

Korea
Djibouti
Dominican Rep
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Ireland
Italy
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
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Lesotho
Liberia
Lithuania
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Korea
Moldova
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Samoa
Senegal

Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Solomon Is
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Surinam

Swaziland
Syrian Rep
Tajikistan
Thailand
Macedonia
Timor
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
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Uganda
Ukraine
Tanzania
Uruguayan
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Appendix B
Countries with Regional Codes
1-Middle East; 2-Africa; 3-Latin America; 4-Aisa; 5-Oceania; 6-Eurasia; 7-E. Europe;
8-W. Europe
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
Morocco
Oman
Syrian Rep
Tunisia
Yemen
Africa
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Cote
Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
G Bissau
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Rep
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
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2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Surinam
Trinidad
Uruguayan
Venezuela
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Cambodia
China
India
Indonesia
Korea
Korea
Laos
Malaysia
Maldives
Mongolia
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Timor
Vietnam
Fiji
Kiribati
Micronesia

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5

Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Is
Tonga
Vanuatu
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Russia
Tajikistan

5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Albania
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Poland

6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
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Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Austria
Cyprus
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Malta
Portugal
Spain
Turkey

7
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
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